Loki as Amoral?
Based on Wolf’s (2020) text, I interpret morality as a set of rules that define what is considered right and that align with societal norms, immorality as that which breaks these norms and is therefore perceived as wrong, and amorality as action outside of a moral frame of reference.
Wolf argues that Loki neither acts from morality nor immorality, but simply acts. I partly agree with this but would also like to nuance this view by suggesting that Loki moves between the moral and the immoral, which makes it difficult to place him within a fixed category such as purely amoral. In the myths, this can be seen in how he sometimes acts in ways that may be interpreted as moral, for example by resolving problems (which he has often caused himself) or by acquiring important objects for the other gods. At the same time, he acts immorally by creating these problems in the first place. As Wolf also highlights, the death of Baldr constitutes an important exception. In this case, Loki neither compensates for the harm he has caused nor acts out of a clearly defined intent to do evil. Here, his actions appear rather as amoral.
Based on this, I understand Loki as a figure who moves between morality, immorality, and amorality, rather than as someone who consistently belongs to one of these categories.
Wolf also writes that “liminal figures do not align with extremes.” Based on my reasoning above, in combination with this statement, I am reminded of Szakolczai (2017), who connects the trickster figure to permanent liminality and argues that “The trickster, however, is only interested in maintaining liminality […]”. When I first read this, I disagreed but found it difficult to articulate why. Perhaps there was an initial reluctance to associate Loki with a state of permanent chaos. However, through Wolf’s text and my own reflections on morality, immorality, and amorality, a possible explanation emerges. Permanent liminality can be understood as an extreme state, in the same way that a strict division between morality and immorality constitutes an extreme. If liminal figures, according to Wolf, do not align with extremes, it becomes problematic to describe Loki as tied to a permanent liminal condition. Rather, Loki appears, much like in the moral dimensions, to move between different positions without being fixed in any of them. This makes it difficult for me to view Loki as representative of any permanent state, whether that be stable structure or continuous liminality. Instead, he appears as a dynamic figure whose function lies in the movement between these states rather than in maintaining any one of them.
The relevance of Loki’s relationship to morality within my own practice is something I have touched upon in a previous assignment, where I wrote that he does not represent a fixed moral framework or provide ready-made answers, but instead compels me to reflect and actively construct my own moral understanding. In my engagement with Loki, I cannot assume that I am “good” by default but must continuously examine my actions and motivations. This becomes meaningful in relation to my interpretation of Loki as a figure who moves between morality, immorality, and amorality. Precisely because he is not fixed in any of these positions, he does not function as a model to imitate, but rather as a force that destabilizes the notion of fixed moral categories. In my practice, this means that morality does not appear as something given or static, but as something that must be explored, negotiated, and at times reconsidered.
My recurring reflections on Loki and morality have therefore not only shaped how I interpret the myths, but also how I understand my own practice. It is through this ongoing process of reflection and reassessment that my above conclusions have emerged.
Additional Reflection: After writing this, I find myself questioning whether it is accurate to describe permanent liminality as an extreme state. If it is instead understood as a condition where stability never fully emerges, then Loki’s relation to it becomes less clear-cut. Rather than resolving the issue, this may point to a deeper ambiguity in the concept itself. This also raises the possibility that figures like Loki may become more resonant in periods characterized by instability, ambiguity, and shifting boundaries. If liminality becomes a more dominant feature of social reality, it may not be that such figures “belong” to permanent liminality, but rather that their function becomes more visible and intelligible within it.
Sources
Szakolczai, Á. (2017) ‘Permanent (trickster) liminality: The reasons of the heart and of the mind’, Theory & Psychology, 27(2), pp. 231–248. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354317694095.
Wolf, A. (2020) ‘The Liminality of Loki’, Scandinavian-Canadian Studies, 27, pp. 106–113. Available at: https://doi.org/10.29173/scancan179.